FOS COMMISSION: JOHN TAYLOR 5

In the first essay of this series, I argued that the corporeal world is characterized by the mind-independence of its sensory qualities.[1] On this basis, we may rejoice that grass is genuinely green and not “mental paint brushed onto a blank canvas of quantity.”[2]

That said, while this initial definition is broadly correct, it does not fully capture Wolfgang Smith’s account of the corporeal world. For it actually overlooks two of the most significant expressions of corporeality: the anthropic and the celestial.

In response to these shortcomings, this essay will aim to not only exposit these expressions, but to integrate them into a more refined interpretation of Smith’s corporeal world.

As has now become something of a tradition, this essay will be divided into two parts.

In Part 1 I will elucidate the three expressions of corporeality, which are: (1) the exoteric, (2) the anthropic, and (3) the celestial. Following this on, in Part 2, I will clarify three pressing questions concerning our newfound corporeality. These are: (1) How should the corporeal world be conceived in its totality? (2) When does the corporeal world end? and (3) Is there a science of corporeality, and if so, how should that science be understood?

Part 1: Outlining Smith’s Corporeality

Exoteric Corporeality

As its title perhaps indicates, exoteric corporeality refers to Wolfgang Smith’s ordinary treatment of the corporeal world. That is, to the species of corporeality, along with its Thomistic metaphysics of irreducible wholeness, discussed throughout this series thus far.

The exoteric expression of corporeality receives its most systematic treatment in The Quantum Enigma, where Smith defines the corporeal world as simply:

“The sum total of things and events that can be directly perceived by a normal human being through the exercise of his sight, his hearing, and his senses of, touch, taste and smell”[3]

Smith clarifies that said “things and events” are: 

“Objective and observer-independent in the strongest conceivable sense.”[4]

Therefore, on the exoteric expression of corporeality sensory qualities are mind-independent simpliciter.[5]Grass is green whether it is perceived or not and there is no need to incorporate the mind into this expression.

However, Smith’s exteriorization of sensory qualities is not simply an aesthetic or heuristic gesture. In fact, it plays a foundational function in his philosophy of science, particularly in his proposed resolution of the measurement problem. To understand how, we must first examine the problem itself and then turn to examine how it relates to Smith’s exoteric corporeality.

At its core, the measurement problem orbits around the perplexing fact that a quantum particle, described mathematically as a superposition or collection of different states, comes to be found in a single state when measured by a macroscopic measuring device.[6] For example, a detector may register a particle at one specific location, even though beforehand quantum mechanics represents it as being in many locations simultaneously.

This striking mismatch gives rise to two closely related difficulties that together constitute the measurement problem. First, the Schrödinger equation, which governs the evolution of a quantum system[7]prior to measurement, is entirely deterministic.[8]Second, standard quantum mechanics provides no mechanism explaining how or why a superposition collapses into a single outcome when measured.[9]Instead, this collapse happens instantaneously and with no process mediating it except probabilities filling the void.[10]

Taken together, these two features expose a significant tension at the heart of quantum theory i.e. the measurement problem. To be clear, the formalism of quantum mechanics predicts the probabilities of possible measurement outcomes with astounding accuracy. But remains silent on how these possibilities become a single determinate result in any given measurement.[11]In a way, quantum systems are runaway trains. The standard theory describes their evolution with surgical precision but provides no brakes to bring them from superposition to single outcome during measurement.

So, if standard physics cannot stop these “runaway trains”, which are quantum systems, what on earth can?

In response, three classes of solution have typically been proposed. The first denies that collapse even occurs at all, as popularized by the many-worlds interpretation.[12]The second introduces new physics to explain collapse, as seen in GRW-type theories.[13]The third accepts the appearance of collapse as primitive, positing a hitherto unexplained transition from the quantum domain, characterised by superpositions, to the classical domain of definite states, as characteristic of the original Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg.[14]

While a full exposé of these alternative solutions falls outside the scope of this essay, it is fair to say that the common bond they all share is one of handwaving the problem rather than tackling it directly.

By stark contrast, Smith’s solution grabs the bull by its horns—proposing that the sudden “braking” of a quantum system is initiated by the exteriority of sensible qualities associated with a quantum measurement device.[15]

To this end Smith reclassifies “quantum particles” as Aristotelian-Thomistic potentialities.[16]Specifically, potentialities in relation to perceptible signs, inhabiting the corporeal, known as “presentations and displays”.[17] 

In short, “presentations” are raw corporeal perceptions such as the colour of an apple or the sound of a moving train.[18]Whereas displays are a class of “presentation” that manifests as scientific results representing something measurable.[19]For example, the audible click of a Geiger counter or the visible position of a pointer reader are “displays” because, while perceptible, they signify an underlying quantifiable entity: namely a quantum particle and the measured state that it has been found in. 

On this account, Smith’s notion of exoteric corporeality effectively “slams the brakes” on a quantum system by introducing a discrete criterion that forces the system to choose one state over another.

To see why, consider a visible pointer on a reader designed to measure position. At any given moment, the pointer can occupy only one determinate location on the reader. Smith contends that this discreteness derives directly from the pointer’s sensible qualities themselves.[20]Since the colour of the pointer cannot simultaneously exist in multiple locations, neither can the pointer as a corporeal object. Consequently, the measured particle collapses into a definite state corresponding to the determinate position of the pointer on the reader, thereby resolving the measurement problem.[21]

Beyond addressing certain problems in quantum mechanics, Smith’s exoteric corporeality also provides answer to how the diverse theories of physics come to be. In conjunction with IW, exoteric corporeality functions as a kind of glass screen through which the irreducible cosmos is refracted into a million different scientific theories, each structured by advanced mathematics and quantification. As this process of “refraction” has already been outlined in detail,[22]I will not elaborate on it any further and will instead turn to Smith’s second expression of corporeality: the anthropic.

Anthropic Corporeality: 

One of Smith’s ideas concerning corporeality, closely tied to his theology of Holy Gnosis,[23] is “anthropic realism”,[24] or, as I shall refer to it in this essay, “anthropic corporeality”.[25]  

In the public reception of Smith’s work, anthropic corporeality has received very little attention and, perhaps, understandably so. The concept does after all pertain to the esoteric side of Smith’s thought and so I think, as a matter of prudence, should be emphasized less when it comes to the public presentation of his work.

As stated by Smith, in Christian Gnosis, and aptly summarized by Dr. Bruno Berard, anthropic realism is understandable in the ensuing sense:

“We know the world we are in as something other than God while He knows all things “within Himself” and denies existence to “every other that is anything except Himself” (Meister Eckhart’s). This means that our world exists in relative sense: for us. Any cosmology that would absolutize the universe would thus violate this fundamental “principle of relativity”.

Philosophically, this principle formulates as “anthropic realism”, in phase with any sapiential tradition, and as the only realist position “in the face of gnosis”. It fundamentally differs from any kind of “academic” realism, beginning with the Cartesian variety, and conforms Husserl’s original intuition but of course not the stand alone development of phenomenology, which renounces metaphysics. He should have stayed “in the face of gnosis” and certainly realized it when he sadly confided to Edith Stein that he had “tried to find God without God!”

Anthropic realism squarely stands “upon the bedrock of unmediated apperception”: we know the world, even when conceived as something external; it exists (only) “for us” and, if we did not know it at all, it would ipso facto not be “our world”. Yet we don’t know it totally: “now we know in part”, St. Paul says. This is because the world too exists “in part”: a mix of Being and non-being, Light and darkness, Act and potency. Also, should we know it “in full” – as God Himself knows –, then it would instantly vanish, like a projected picture disappears in the fullness of light.

What vanishes then is not the partial light but rather the preceding darkness, meaning that what are negated in supreme knowledge are “negations” (Meister Eckhart’s). What disappears has not been destroyed because it never actually existed. This is why Christ declares: “I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil”.”[26]

Leaving aside Smith’s musings on Holy Gnosis, anthropic corporeality basically claims that sensory qualities are indeed external, but not in a naïve sense. They are external but always correlated with a mind. External, but with the purpose of being given to a perceiving subject. On this view, the world is not a thing existing “in itself,” but is irreducibly a world-for-consciousness: outside of us yet always indexed for us.[27]

A useful example of this kind of relationship can be found in James J Gibson’s concept of affordances from his ecological psychology.[28] 

On Gibson’s account, affordances are real properties of the external environment. However, they are relational, always defined by what the environment offers for a perceiving subject.[29]

Consider, for example, the “climbability” of a tree, a textbook Gibsonian affordance. A tree undeniably possesses certain structural features that make climbing it possible. However, “climabality” cannot be understood independently of the capacities and actions of a potential climber. In this sense, a tree’s “climbability” is neither wholly objective nor wholly subjective but instead exists at the interface between subject and object.[30]

Comparably, one might say that, in Smith’s framework, the corporeal world, and indeed the whole cosmos, exist externally but always relative to a conscious observer.[31] The world therefore does not reduce to a Cartesian mental projection. But nor does it fully reduce to externality either, since it is an externality that discloses itself through the intermeshing of subject and object.[32] From this perspective, Gibsonian affordances provide a concrete example of a more general mind–world correlation and can thus be taken as symbols of anthropic corporeality more generally.

Echoing James Gibson, to whom I shall return later, Smith’s notion of anthropic corporeality also finds resonance in the work of Edmund Husserl.[33] The founder of the phenomenological tradition and teacher of St. Edith Stein.

Like Gibson, Husserl believed that the subject and the object form an irreducible wholeness. For every conscious act, what Husserl calls a Noeisis, there is a corresponding object, a Noema, and vice versa.[34] For example, the act of observing a tree always corresponds with a tree and a tree always corresponds with an intentional act of observation—both are made for each other and are yet inseparable.[35]This “correlation”, as Husserl calls it,[36] thereby, suggests an entanglement of subject and object corresponding to precisely the kind of anthropic realism that Wolfgang Smith suggests! 

As will become clearer, both the Gibsonian and Husserlian approaches constitute bona fide sciences of the corporeal world. However, before understanding how each approach achieves scientific clarity, a task reserved for Part II, we must turn to Wolfgang Smith’s third mode of corporeality: the celestial.

Celestial Corporeality?

In one of Smith’s lesser-known essays, entitled Celestial Corporeality, he argues that corporeality originates in, and exists in purified mode, in the aeviternal realm.[37] Drawing on the writings of the great mystics, Jakob Böhme and Julius Hamberger,[38] Smith explicates this mode in the following way:

“In the terrestrial domain corporeal entities “occupy space”, which is to say, admit extension; we need thus to ask ourselves whether the same applies in the celestial world. Now it is clear from the start that “celestial space”—if indeed there be such a thing—does not simply coincide with the space we know by way of sense perception. Celestial bodies are not situated, properly speaking, in our space. “Neither Shall they say, Lo here!, or, lo there! For behold the kingdom of God is within you”.[39]

A similar statement made by Smith also appears in his final book where he writes:

“The aeviternal realm is inherently the cosmos in its integrality before it is fragmented into innumerable bits and pieces through the imposition of temporal and spatial bounds”.[40] 

Smith returns to the notion of celestial corporeality in his essay on the astrologer Oscar Marcel Hinze, where he likewise suggests that, on the aeviternal plane,

“There is reason to believe that the categorical separation between the visual, the auditory, and sensory domains is likewise transcended”.[41] 

Adding that individuals under the influence of psychedelic drugs have reported experiences such as “feeling, hearing and smelling sound”.[42]

Taken together, these remarks raise an important question: how, precisely, is Smith’s notion of celestial corporeality to be understood?

In response, I believe that celestial corporeality is best interpreted using St Maximus the Confessor’s doctrine of the Logos and the logoi.[43]

At its core, St Maximus’ doctrine states that the Eternal Logos, our Blessed Lord Jesus Christ, contains within Him divine logoi; which are archetypal principles or intelligible patterns according to which all created things are fashioned.[44] Crucially, St. Maximus’ teaching is not just speculative metaphysics but deeply grounded in Holy Scripture. As God declares to Jeremiah, “Before I knit you together in your mother’s womb, I knew you,”[45] thereby intimating the pre-existence of the divine logoi within the mind of God. Overall, these logoi form the intelligible foundation and inner rationale of the entire created order.

In Thomistic terms, the divine logoi may be understood as being analogous to substantial forms existing eternally within the intellect of God prior to their cosmic manifestation, where they confer structure, intelligibility, and actuality onto matter. Within this framework, irreducible wholeness functions as the primordial cosmic logos and efficient actualizer of creation: the foundational cosmic principle from which all other logoi emanate and by which they are providentially placed into creation by God.

As I argued in my second essay, IW serves as the metaphysical “cement” upon which all created realities depend. Through His creative authority, via IW, God introduces these realities—expressed as logoi—directly into the cosmos, establishing from the outset its order, integrity, and intelligible unity.

With respect to celestial corporeality, the divine logoi of St. Maximus enter the aeviternal domain as pristine archetypes of the corporeal world we experience, as well as of all subordinate orders of reality. In this manner, they abide within the “celestial space”[46] of aeviternity so frequently mentioned by Smith. By “celestial space,” we might picture an abstract analogue to physical extension. A supra-sensible interiority, if you will, akin to what certain esoteric thinkers describe as “inner space”[47] or “the space within the locus of the heart”.[48] 

It is in this “celestial space” that the logoi of corporeal perceptions (e.g. the colour green) receive their truest, most natural expression and transcend the separations of the individual senses. Accordingly, it is precisely in this celestial realm of aeviternity that people have described not merely hearing specific sounds but also seeing and feeling them.

After having entered celestial space, these logoi then “descend” into the lower strata of the cosmos. At this stage, they become diversified and dispersed into “innumerable bits and pieces.”[49] Within the realm of “terrestrial space,”[50] the space we inhabit, these logoi function as forms that sustain both substances and sensible qualities. By way of terrestrial space, we perceive these sensible qualities in a fragmented way—that is by an individual sense only. The logoi of the colour green, inhering in an apple, can only be seen, not touched or smelt, at the terrestrial level. Think of celestial space as air. In air we perceive white light in its most natural form. However, through a prism white light is refracted into different colours. Terrestrial space is like a prism refracting the logoi of sensible qualities in such a way that they can only be perceived by one sense. Amazing!

Part 2: Questions to be Considered

Having exposited the three distinct expressions of corporeality, we can now turn to three crucial questions concerning their individual character and their relationship to each other.

1. How should the corporeal world be conceived in its totality? 

In response to the first question, I propose the following interpretation of Smithian corporeality. One that both unifies and clarifies the three expressions of this domain.

First, celestial corporeality is the original corporeality. It is contained within God’s mind and then stored archetypally in the aeviternal realm for our meditation and cosmic access. In the celestial space of aeviternity, celestial corporeality includes the logoi of corporeal objects and the logoi of their sensorial qualities. Subsequently, these logoi descend into the corporeal world which we perceive by way of our individual senses alone. Prior to this descent sensorial logoi are perceivable, in the aeviternal plane, in a manner that transcends the separation of our individual senses. However, these perceptions are rare and only accessed by mystics and, for whatever reason, those taking psychedelic drugs.

Second, anthropic corporeality corresponds to the true esoteric nature of the corporeal world we perceive with our ordinary five individual senses. On this view, sensory qualities are mind-independent, though only in the qualified sense that they are mind-independent for us.

Third, exoteric corporeality approximates the anthropic. In this respect, the exoteric treats sensory qualities as wholly mind-independent and, in doing so, omits the asterisk stating that they are mind-independent “for us”.

Within Smith’s thought, exoteric corporeality serves two principal functions. First, providing a swift resolution to the measurement problem complete with a straightforward interpretation of physics. Given the physicist’s Cartesian mindset, it is arguably simpler to describe sensory qualities as external simpliciter, without introducing the further nuance that they are “external for us”. Second, exoteric corporeality functions as a conceptual stepping stone towards eventually understanding anthropic corporeality. Only after one has grasped the externality of sensory qualities can one then proceed to comprehend that this externality exists “for us” and appreciate fully the implications that this entails.

2. When does the corporeal world end?

As we have now established, corporeality originates in the celestial, manifests most plainly in the exoteric, and is clarified by the anthropic. But where, precisely, does it end? At what point do entities become so small that we pass from the corporeal, which we perceive, to the subcorporeal that exists behind the veil of perception?

I raise these questions because the threshold between the perceptible and the merely measurable is not actually clear-cut. Consider entities such as cells: they are imperceptible to the naked eye but become observable under an optical microscope. Should cells be considered corporeal or subcorporeal? 

Cases such as these appear to expose a gap within Smith’s ontology, as it currently stands. More specifically, they expose an ambiguity in how corporeal and physical entities are to be distinguished and classified.

To resolve this difficulty, I propose dividing the subcorporeal into three distinct sub-domains:

(1) The Sub-Perceivable: Refers to entities SX that can only be perceived by the senses with the aid of instruments that extend, magnify, or enhance human perception. These entities are typically too small or subtle to be detected by the unaided senses. Examples include bacteria or cells observed through an optical microscope, where the instrument functions as an extension of vision rather than as a device that reconstructs the entity from processed data. Those miniature entities perceived by reconstructing the scientific object through a measurement procedure are disqualified from the sub-perceivable. For instance, entities imaged through an electron microscope fall outside this category, since an electron microscope does not simply enhance natural sight but instead detects electron interactions and reconstructs the object as a visual representation. 

(2) The Sub-Projectible: Refers to entities SX too small to be perceived even with instruments enhancing our senses. But which could exist on the corporeal plane if their scale were sufficiently magnified. Unlike mathematically abstract scientific entities, sub-projectible entities retain a conceivable continuity with ordinary perceptual objects; their invisibility is a matter of scale rather than of ontological abstraction. Examples of sub-projectible entities include DNA, ultra-microscopic organisms and imperceptible fibres. While these entities cannot be perceived with an optical microscope or any other instrument, their configuration is such that if they were “made big enough” we could perceive them at our level. For example, a DNA molecule could theoretically be constructed as a scaled-up model accessible by ordinary perception.

(3) The Sub-Measurable: Refers to those measurable entities of SX that, theoretically, 

cannot be magnified or “projected” onto the corporeal plane due to their mathematized or abstract nature. Examples include mass, weight, force, momenta, energy, work, and quantum particles. These entities are fundamentally abstract and therefore cannot simply be scaled up to become directly perceptible on the corporeal plane. No matter how “big a force is made” it can never be perceived because it is by nature an abstraction; albeit a very useful one for prediction-making!

With this tripartite division now established, we can finally answer the question of where the corporeal world ends. It ends at the sub-measurable! At the point where scientific entities become so abstract that, even if magnified a millionfold, they would lack a corporeal analogue. The remaining domains the sub-perceivable and the sub-projectible are, thus, subcorporeal in name only.

Moreover, this distinction provides a framework for differentiating between the “actual entities” of scientific inquiry and the potentialities intertwined with mathematical physics. Within mainstream philosophy of science, this distinction also bears directly on the realism—anti-realism debate[51] and might even offer a meaningful extension of Ian Hacking’s entity realism.[52]

3. Is there a science of corporeality, and if so, how should that science be understood?

The question of whether a science of corporeality exists has, in large part, already been answered. Such a science does exist in James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology and in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. However, I believe that a third science of corporeality may also be discerned in the ancient physics of the early cosmologists, particularly in Aristotle.

I will now explain how each of these sciences finds its place within this new interpretation of corporeality.

First, Aristotle’s physics, as a science, pertains to the exoteric expression of the corporeal world. For those unfamiliar Aristotle’s physics carves out a system whereby the motions of corporeal objects are explained in terms of their teloi and other ontological features.[53] An apple, for instance, falls to the ground primarily because its end-goal is to be there not because of a gravitational constant.[54] I have argued elsewhere that Aristotelian physics is compatible with modern physical theories.[55] It would be interesting to see whether this compatibility could be enhanced into a fully-fledged “corporeal physics”: a system in which the motions of objects are explained entirely through corporeal laws, with modern physical explanations understood as derivative shadows of those deeper principles. Incidentally, during my meeting with Smith in Camarillo, I recall him expressing openness to such an idea.

With respect to the corporeal world, Aristotelian physics clearly pertains to its exoteric expression. Since, it brackets the subject-object relation central to anthropic corporeality and concerns itself instead with the externality of sensible qualities and their relation to a teleological metaphysics.

Second, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology pertains to anthropic corporeality. In broad terms, Husserl employs the distinction between noesis and noema, together with methodological concepts such as eidetic reduction, to provide a systematic account of the relationship between subject and object[56]. In doing so, he offers a rigorous description of how embodied consciousness constitutes and encounters the world, thereby furnishing a scientific account of what I have termed anthropic corporeality.[57] 

For example, when a person perceives a tree, Husserl would distinguish between the noesis, the conscious act of perceiving, and the noema, the tree as it is experienced in consciousness. Through “eidetic reduction”, one can then bracket accidental details (such as the tree’s colour, location, or species) to identify the essential structures of embodied perception itself.

Finally, I believe, James J. Gibson implicitly invokes all three expressions of corporeality within his ecological psychology. At the exoteric level, Gibsonian science assumes and scientifically describes the externality of sensory qualities through what Gibson terms the “ambient optic array”,[58] the structured field of reflected light through which perception takes place.[59] According to Gibson the ambient optic array is populated by invariants. [60]As will become clear in the next essay these invariants correspond to St Maximus’s Divine logoi, thereby bringing celestial corporeality into the account. Moreover, the interaction between the external environment, as Gibson terms it, and the conscious subject assumes the form of a subject-object entanglement[61] strongly reminiscent of anthropic corporeality. Hence, in constructing his science of perception, Gibson subtly invokes all three expressions of corporeality.

James Gibson and Beyond:

With our interpretation of corporeality now established, the stage is set to further investigate the different sciences of perception. In the next chapter I will do precisely that by investigating how James Gibson’s ecological psychological constitutes “the true science of perception”.

Bibliography:

Berard, Bruno. Wolfgang Smith: Cosmology in the Face of Gnosis. (2023). Sophia. Volume 12. 2006. https://metafysikos.com/en/wolfgang-smith-cosmology-in-the-face-of-gnosis/ 

Smith, Wolfgang. The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key. (2005). [TQE] Third Revised Edition. Angelico Press. San Rafael, California.

Smith, Wolfgang. Christian Gnosis: From Saint Paul to Meister Eckhart. (2011). Second Edition. Angelico Press. San Rafael, California.

Smith, Wolfgang. Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions: A Critique of Contemporary Scientism. (2013). (Revised and Expanded Edition of The Wisdom of Ancient Cosmology: Contemporary Science in light of Tradition). Angelico Press. San Rafael, California.

Smith, Wolfgang. Physics: A Science in Quest of an Ontology. (2023). [PSQ] Second Edition. Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation. Camarillo, California.

Smith, Wolfgang. Science and Myth: With a Response to Stephen Hawking’s The Grand Design. (2012). First Edition. Angelico Press. San Rafael, California.

Ghirardi, Giancarlo and Angelo Bassi, "Collapse Theories", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/qm-collapse/ 

Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315740218/ecological-approach-visual-perception-james-gibson 

Myrvold, Wayne, "Philosophical Issues in Quantum Theory", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/qt-issues/ 

Everett, Hugh. The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction. In B. S. DeWitt & N. Graham, The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton UP (1973)

Edmund Husserl, Translated by F. Kersten, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 1982. First Book. Kulwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht, Netherlands.

St Maximus the Confessor. Translated by Joshua Lollar. Ambigua to John. (2024). Volume 1: Translation. Corpus Christianorum in Translation 45. Brepols. Turnhout, Belgium 

Oxford University Press. (2008). Revised Standard Version Catholic Bible. Oxford University Press. Jeremiah 1:5

Okasha, Samir (2002). Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hacking, Ian (1984). Experimentation and Scientific Realism. In Jarrett Leplin, Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 154-172.

John J Taylor (2024). Newtonian and Aristotelian Physics: Wolfgang Smith’s Path to Reconciliation. Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation. https://philos-sophia.org/naw-reconciliation/?srsltid=AfmBOoq7CsxYM5NywrdKcj_qv-MLCuv7ENiTbX7SeFXw1Z52UNQL0n2L 

Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. In Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1: Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1984).

[1] Along with its Thomistic metaphysics and irreducible wholeness.

[2] See Essay 1

[3] Smith, TQE, P.26

[4] Smith, TQE, P.15

[5] Smith, TQE, P.15

[6] Myrvold, Philosophical issues in Quantum Theory, Chapter 4.1

[7] As a superposition.

[8] Myrvold, Philosophical issues in Quantum Theory, Chapter 4.1

[9] Myrvold, Philosophical issues in Quantum Theory, Chapter 4.1

[10] Giancarlo Ghirardi and Angelo Bassi, Collapse Theories, Chapter 2

[11] Myrvold, Philosophical issues in Quantum Theory, Chapter 4.1

[12] Everett, The Theory of The Universal Wave Function.

[13] Giancarlo Ghirardi and Angelo Bassi, Collapse Theories, Chapter 4-5

[14] Myrvold, Philosophical issues in Quantum Theory, Chapter 4.1

[15] Smith, TQE, P.68-69

[16] Smith, TQE, P.62

[17] Smith, TQE, P.35-36

[18] Smith, TQE, P.35

[19] Smith, TQE, P.35-36

[20] Smith, TQE, P.36

[21] Smith, TQE, P.68-69

[22] See Essay 1, Essay 2, Essay 3, and Essay 4

[23] Smith, Christian Gnosis, P.38-39

[24] Smith, Christian Gnosis, P.38-39

[25] Anthropic realism applies to the whole cosmos from aeviternity to transcorporeality. Whereas, anthropic corporeality is a subset of anthropic realism applied to the perceivable or corporeal world.

[26] Berard, Sophia Vol. 12, Part 1 “Anthropic Realism”

[27] Smith, Christian Gnosis, P.38-39

[28] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 8

[29] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 8, P.119-121

[30] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 8, P.121

[31] Smith, Christian Gnosis, P.38-39

[32] Smith, Christian Gnosis, P.38-39

[33] Husserl, Ideas, P.214-215

[34] Husserl, Ideas, P.214-215

[35]Husserl, Ideas, P.214-215

[36] Husserl, Ideas, P.214-215

[37] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.68-69

[38] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.71-72

[39] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.85

[40] Smith, PSQ, P.23

[41] Smith, Science and Myth, P.134

[42] Smith, Science and Myth, P.134

[43] St Maximus The Confessor, Ambigua to John, Ambiguum 7,1077C

[44] St Maximus The Confessor, Ambigua to John, Ambiguum 7,1077C

[45] Jeremiah 1:5

[46] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.68-69

[47] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.86

[48] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.86

[49] Smith, PSQ, P.23

[50] Smith, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions, P.85

[51] Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 4

[52] Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism

[53] Aristotle, Physics, Book IV

[54] Aristotle, Physics, Book IV

[55] Taylor, Newtonian and Aristotelian Physics: Wolfgang Smith’s Path to Reconciliation

[56] Husserl, Ideas, P.137-143 and P.214-215

[57] Husserl, Ideas, P.137-143 and P.214-215

[58] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 5, P.58

[59] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 5, P.58-62

[60] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 5, P.79-83

[61] Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Chapter 8, P.119-121