FoS COMMISSION: JOHN TAYLOR 4

In the previous essay I demonstrated how a Platonist ontology of science can be appropriately applied to physics. In this essay I will now build on that analysis by extending it to some of the other sciences. More specifically to three other hard sciences: Biology, Chemistry, Computer Science and to two of the so-called soft sciences: Economics and Sociology. 

Although the two main principles of Smithian science likely reach well beyond these respective fields, the disciplines mentioned here will be examined on the desiderata that they are among the most influential and central in mainstream discourse. 

With that said, let us now turn to the relevant sciences and examine, one by one, how each relates to irreducible wholeness. To structure this discussion, this essay is divided into two parts: Part I focuses on the three hard sciences, and Part II addresses two soft sciences. I will then conclude by reflecting on how the implications of this analysis acts as a bridge to the next section on Mind and Perception. 

Part I The Hard Sciences:

Biology

It goes without saying that the field of biology is rampant with exemplars of IW. And while I cannot possibly survey the entire field of biology in one swoop, I can and will now offer some insights on three areas of biology where IW is apparent and fulfils the two principles of Smithian science. These three areas are: Dembski’s complex specified information, Behe’s irreducible complexity, and Sheldrake’s Morphic fields.

With that said, the first case in which IW appears in Biology is, Complex Specified Information (CSI). A notion closely tied with the intelligent design movement.[1] While the debate surrounding intelligent design versus Darwinian evolution is indeed highly polemical, for the purposes of this essay, I will assume in line with Smith’s thinking, the validity of the latter. However, at the same time, I will also acknowledge that there exist complexities to this debate that the inquisitive reader should explore on their own![2]

In his groundbreaking article “Irreducible Wholeness and Dembski’s Theorem” Wolfgang Smith contends that “horizontal causation cannot give rise to irreducible wholeness”. Instead, such wholeness, he argues, can only arise through vertical causation.[3] Smith designates this result the “Generalized Dembski Theorem,”[4] presenting it as a universalization of a more formally defined mathematical theorem concerning complex specified information (CSI), that was originally formulated by the mathematician and philosopher of science William Dembski.[5]

In essence, Dembski’s complex specified information denotes a type of information that is 1. highly improbable to have arisen by chance 2. Conforms to a specific pattern and 3. Consists of a large number of basic units i.e. is complex. For the more technically adept, the notion of “information”, here, matches the standard definition advanced by physicist Claude Shannon: who characterizes information as a measure of the reduction of an uncertainty.[6]To strongly illustrate Shannon’s basic idea, consider a coin flip landing on heads. Prior to this outcome, there is an uncertainty about which side the coin will land on. However, once the result is known that uncertainty is reduced. In this way, through the reduction of an uncertainty, the outcome of the coin flip constitutes a transmission of Shannon information to the observer.[7]

Building on this analysis we can now consider a concrete example of CSI, in the famous line “To be or not to be, that is the question,” from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a phrase that has also been frequently cited by Wolfgang Smith.[8] Firstly, this line qualifies as CSI because it is highly specific, conforming to a recognizable literary pattern that conveys meaning in English. Secondly, because it is exceedingly unlikely that such an arrangement of words could have ever arisen by chance. Thirdly, because such an arrangement of words is complex.

In contrast, consider a random line of letters such as “XQFZLPE”. Although this line may be as equally improbable as the latter to have arisen by chance it does not fulfil an independent literary pattern and so would not qualify as a piece of Complex Specified Information. It would instead qualify as what Dembski calls a “Specified Simplicity”. 

Overall, the key takeaway from Dembski’s theorem is that CSI is overwhelmingly indicative of design, whereas specified simplicity is not. In short, this conclusion rests on the sheer improbability that a CSI could ever arise through processes that lack the direct intention to produce such structured meaningful outcomes. Take Shakespeare’s Hamlet, for instance, it could not plausibly have come about by a monkey bashing away at a keyboard—whereas a book of random letters easily could! Hence, it is precisely from this improbability that Dembski infers the design-based origins of all complex specified information.

With CSI defined, let us now return to Wolfgang Smith who believed that the meaning conveyed behind a string of complex specified information far surpasses the sum of parts that make it up[9]. 

Professor Smith was likely led to this conclusion on the basis that the patterns which strings of CSI fulfil, are themselves aeviternal ideals; detachable IWs from the sums of parts which instantiate them in corporeality. This point is strongly implied by Smith when he states the following:

“The crucial point is that, in light of the Platonist ontology, the “intelligible” is actually situated “above space and time,” and thus on the aeviternal plane itself. Unbelievable as it may strike the contemporary mind, the efficacy of what Dembski terms a “specification” resides in the fact that its ultimate referent proves to be aeviternal.”[10]

Hence, from this quotation, one can conclude that all instances of Complex Specified Information participate in an aeviternal ideal and so must also be instances of irreducible wholeness. 

As stated at the beginning, in biology, instances of CSI and consequently irreducible wholeness are abundant; with the most notorious, example of CSI being DNA molecules. I will now outline this exemplar and its correspondence with irreducible wholeness in detail:

In essence, DNA molecules consist of sequences of nucleic acids within cells that encode the precise order and arrangement of amino acids in proteins through a process known as protein synthesis. The different nitrogeneous bases, which help compose DNA, are represented with the following letters A (Adenine), T (Thymine), G (Guanine), C (Cytosine).

Overall, protein synthesis is a process fundamental to the existence and maintenance of biological life. For it is the mechanism by which genetic information is first transcribed into messenger RNA and then translated by ribosomes into functional proteins. These proteins perform an extraordinary range of essential roles, including: catalysing biochemical reactions as enzymes, providing structural support to cells and tissues, enabling transport of molecules, and regulating virtually all cellular processes. Without the precise informational structure encoded in DNA, and its faithful expression through protein synthesis, living systems would not be able to maintain their organisation, respond to their environment, or sustain the complex processes required for biological existence. 

According to Dembski DNA meets the criteria for Complex Specified Information. Since, firstly, it is a form of information in the Shannon sense. This is widely accepted in science because DNA can be modelled as a sequence of symbols drawn from a finite alphabet (A, T, G, C), where each base reduces uncertainty about what comes next. Secondly, it is complex. The strings of DNA are incredibly vast in their length. Finally, the information is specified because it conforms to arranging specific patterns of amino acids for the process of protein synthesis. Consequently, DNA qualifies as a form of complex specified information and thus as a form of irreducible wholeness.[11]

Departing entirely from Complex Specified Information a second example of where I believe irreducible wholeness springs up in Biology is in another but related concept, also from the Intelligent Design movement, but seldom mentioned by Wolfgang Smith. Namely, the concept of Irreducible Complexityfrom Michael Behe. Incidentally, from an etymological standpoint alone, it is tempting to speculate that Behe’s term may have influenced Smith’s parallel term of irreducible wholeness. However, the connection between the two concepts is not merely linguistic, for they are deeply intertwined at the conceptual level as well.

In his book Darwin’s Black Box Behe defines Irreducible Complexity as follows:

“a single system composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes that system to effectively cease functioning.”[12]

In other words, irreducible complexity refers to systems composed of multiple interacting parts in which the removal of any one of those parts would cause the system to lose its ability to operate. The basic idea is that such systems depend on having all their parts present, simultaneously, for their overall function. In terms of Darwinian evolution Behe uses irreducible complexity to argue that there are certain features that could not have emerged from a more primitive variant of that feature.

A frequently cited example of irreducible complexity, by Behe, is the bacterial flagellum, a whip-like appendage used by certain bacteria for movement. The flagellum functions somewhat like a rotary motor. Since it consists of a long, helical filament that acts as a propeller, a hook-like structure that connects the filament to the base, and a complex basal body embedded in the cell membrane. This basal body includes a series of ring-like structures and a molecular motor that spans the membrane, allowing it to rotate the filament and propel the bacterium through its environment.[13]

Proponents of irreducible complexity argue that if any one of these components were removed, the flagellum would no longer be able to function as a motility device. For example, without the filament, there is nothing to generate thrust; without the motor proteins, there is no rotation; and without the structural base, the system cannot anchor or transmit motion. Because of this tight interdependence, the flagellum is often presented as an example of a system that would not work if assembled in a step-by-step, partially functional manner.[14]

That said, Michael Behe’s concept of irreducible complexity can arguably be seen as a functional instance of Wolfgang Smith’s concept of irreducible wholeness and, furthermore, sheds light on how IW manifests along two different ontological axes present at the corporeal: the configurational and the teleological. 

As Smith frequently argues, Irreducible Wholeness (IW) exists within the aeviternal plane. At this level, IW is unbroken, unchanging, and without distinct axes. Corporeal entities, being composite and exceeding the mere sum of their parts, point beyond themselves by participating in this original irreducible wholeness. However, in doing so, they often align along two distinct axes which correspond to Aristotelian causation. These different axes of IW only become apparent at the corporeal level after IW has disintegrated, so to speak, to manifest in distinct substances.

The first axes, which I term the configurational, is where a corporeal entity points beyond its sum of parts configuration. That is beyond its summed building blocks and to a necessary form that unifies them as an irreducibly whole substance. The second axis is where a corporeal entity participates in a functionality or teleological purpose again not reducible to its set of parts (as is the case with all teloi found at the corporeal level). Of course, the teleological axis of IW is inseparable from the configurational axis—as both are unified in the aeviternal plane. However, despite their inseparability, the manifestation of these axes may become distinctly apparent in certain phenomena. Perhaps irreducible complexity is one such phenomenon. An empirical manifestation of parts-based organisms participating in a teleological purpose that manifestly transcends its parts. 

Moving on, a third and perhaps more novel example of irreducible wholeness occurring in biological systems is  Rupert Sheldrake’s notion of Morphic Fields. 

Intriguingly, I recall having numerous discussions with Wolfgang Smith where he conveyed his belief that Sheldrake’s notion of Morphic fields supports vertical causation.

In short Sheldrake’s concept of Morphic fields can be summarized as follows:

Morphic fields are hypothesized principles of organization, a bit like Aristotelian forms, said to determine the shape and behaviour of biological systems through non-local influences.[15]

Sheldrake first introduced Morphic fields as a proposed solution to the problem of morphogenesis. The issue of how living organisms develop their characteristic forms and structures. Despite significant advances in modern biology, Morphogenesis has not been fully explained by standard science.[16]

According to Sheldrake, morphic fields guide developing organisms towards specific shapes. Sheldrake further suggests that these fields help account for how behaviours emerge and spread within species across large distances. This transmission, he argued, occurs through a process called “morphic resonance”: a non-spatiotemporal mechanism by which patterns of form and behaviour are propagated across a species.[17]

For example, when individuals within a species acquire a new behaviour, such as rats learning a novel task in one location, it is hypothesised that other rat populations may subsequently learn that same task but more rapidly, even without direct contact between the two groups. Hence, this accelerated learning Sheldrake attributes to “morphic resonance”.[18] 

To give a second example, morphic fields are also said to account for how embryos reliably assume their shape and form over time. A developing embryo is said to be guided not only by genetic and biochemical processes, but also by a morphic field containing the “form” of the mature organism, stabilised by the repeated development of that species over time.[19] 

Evidently, just a cursory examination of morphic fields suggests that they exemplify Smith’s “irreducible wholeness.” Since firstly, these fields are posited to operate across vast distances, enabling the effective propagation of information: an attribute that implies they cannot be reduced to a mere aggregation of parts. Secondly, because morphic fields have a participatory nature. Meaning that they possess the characteristic of allowing species and organisms, of one kind, to tap into a particular field while excluding species and organisms, of another kind, from tapping into that same field (they must tap into another). This participatory trait strongly suggests an irreducibility to Morphic fields and concords with the Smithian hypothesis that morphic fields might have an aeviternal origin.

To wrap up this section on biology what is particularly striking about all three areas just discussed, is that they each satisfy the two principles of Smithian science. First, it is evident that irreducible wholeness is essential for many of these fields to function at all, thereby fulfilling Principle 1. Secondly, in these cases irreducible wholeness arises through a grounding-to-emergence relationship, thereby fulfilling Principle 2. For example, in the case of complex specified information, irreducible wholeness emerges through the realization of higher-order patterns.

Chemistry

Just like Biology, the field of Chemistry is also extremely multitudinous in nature, and the presence of IW is equally as discernible, in accordance with the two principles of Smithian science.

To name one significant example of where IW appears in Chemistry, is in Molecular Structures, which I will now make the case for. 

In short, individual Molecules are composed of atoms held together by covalent bonds. Resultingly, a molecular structure refers to the three-dimensional structures shown by atoms in a molecule. The philosopher Robin Hendry has argued that whole molecular structures, described by a “Coulombic Schrodinger Equation”, are not reducible to descriptions between individual atoms using standard quantum theory. Thus, generating a case of what Hendry calls strong emergence and Smith calls Irreducible Wholeness.[20] 

Overall, the emergence of structures which are far greater than the sum of their parts, in Chemistry, also concords with the two principles of Smithian science. Since, firstly, IW is needed to make the science of molecular structures work, thus, supporting Principle 1. If the physics of molecular structures did not transcend the standard physics of quantum theory, then there would be no molecular structures at all. Secondly, IW in molecular structures manifests as a grounding-to-emergence process, by becoming evident in higher-order molecular structures, thereby supporting Principle 2.

Computer Science

With biology and chemistry considered we now turn to computer science—the study and operation of digital computers. 

At the material level, a digital computer consists of hardware that manipulates matter specifically, streams of electrons moving through silicon transistors, to perform computations. However, a computer is not fully captured by its physical components alone. For, equally essential to its nature is its software, which comprises of algorithms and data structures.[21] 

Evidently, the entities of computer software are abstract rather than physical. As such George Ellis argues these abstract structures exert genuine top-down causation on a computer’s underlying hardware. In practice, such algorithms govern the behaviour of a computer by determining when and where electrons are permitted to flow through specific transistors. In this way, non-physical informational patterns appear to organize and constrain physical processes by shaping the operation of the computer as a whole.[22]

Given all this digital computers it seems are a mesh of the physical and non-physical alike. As computer scientists Abelson and Sussman put it: “computational processes are abstract beings that inhabit computers….In effect we conjure up spirits of the computer with our spells”.[23]

Recast in Smithian terms, computer algorithms can be understood as aeviternal IWs. The physical hardware of the computer does not merely implement the algorithm; it participates in its instantiation. The silicon substrate, the flow of electrons through transistors, and the abstract structure of the algorithm together form an irreducible wholeness that gives rise to the strange “magic” of computation.

Understood in this way, the digital age offers little support for a straightforward materialist weltanschauung as people think today. On the contrary, it points to the opposite, by offering perhaps the most clear-cut example of the tripartite nature of our reality.

Moreover, it is also worth noting that, insofar as computers take the form of an IW, they satisfy both principles of Smithian science. First, the irreducible wholeness of algorithms is essential to the functioning of computation, thereby fulfilling Principle 1. Second, this irreducible wholeness only becomes manifest at the higher-order level of the computer in the form of its algorithm, thereby satisfying Principle 2.

Part II The Soft Sciences:

Having explored how irreducible wholeness presents itself within the hard sciences, we now turn to the soft sciences. By “soft sciences,” I mean systems of thought that engage less with purely physical phenomena but with society using first principles. To this end I will review the connection between Economics and Sociology and irreducible wholeness.

Economics

When it comes to economics, the study of how markets function and resources are allocated, there are famously two broad disciplines. The macro and the micro. 

Much like in physics, the fundamental principles governing macro-level and micro-level systems differ across these domains. In microeconomics, prices in relatively small markets, such as those within cities or towns, are largely determined by the law of supply and demand. This principle states that when the supply of a good is lower than the demand for it, prices tend to rise, and when supply exceeds demand, prices tend to fall.

However, this relationship does not carry over directly to macroeconomics, which deals with entire national economies. At this scale, the law of supply and demand must be understood in an aggregated sense, as the interaction of many individual markets produces more complex and less straightforward outcomes. Moreover, macroeconomics introduces phenomena that are not readily explained by microeconomic logic alone, such as Keynes’ Paradox of Thrift and broader theories of business cycles, which require distinct frameworks to describe economic behaviour at the level of the whole economy.

As a result, there is a clear conceptual distinction between micro and macroeconomic analysis, with each relying on different models and laws to explain economic behaviour at their respective scales.

This then raises a deeper question: what, fundamentally, separates these two domains of economics—and is there any evidence of irreducible wholeness underlying that separation?

In my view, the only meaningful line separating macroeconomics from microeconomics is Smith’s irreducible wholeness. I arrive at this conclusion because, much like computer systems, economic systems exist as an intricate blend of the physical and the non-physical. While concepts such as prices, assets, and markets are abstract, they are ultimately grounded in and constrained by real physical conditions and human behaviour.

Economics, taken as a whole, therefore occupies a space where the concrete and the abstract are deeply blurred. This blending suggests a degree of irreducibility: that the system cannot be fully understood simply by reducing it to its smallest parts without losing something essential about its overall behaviour. From this perspective, irreducible wholeness provides a natural conceptual boundary between macro and microeconomics, distinguishing the study of individual components from the study of the economy as an emergent whole.

Furthermore, the distinction between macro and micro-economics aligns with the two core principles of Smithian science. Firstly, since economies are a blend between the physical and non-physical it follows that IW is needed to undergird their existence, thus meeting Principle 1. Secondly, the evidence of IW only becomes apparent at the boundary between macro and micro economies, thereby fulfilling Principle 2.

Sociology

As a field sociology studies how society does and ought to operate. There are of course many theories, of dubious credentials, which offer accounts of how societies came to be and function (Marxism being one). Within the context of our initiative, however, the most appropriate framework for understanding social life is the Church’s teaching and theology.

That said, Wolfgang Smith’s concept of irreducible wholeness still offers several valuable insights that can fruitfully complement the Church’s teaching. 

In particular, it is reasonable to view nation states as irreducible wholes possessing their own substantial form. More specifically, this form can be understood as comprising the corporeal reality of the nation itself, within which its people, established frameworks of laws, customs, and institutions participate in and help to shape its mode of being.

A related and illuminating parallel can also be found in the work of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim, who argued that “a society is always more than the sum of its individuals.” For Durkheim, societies are not reducible to aggregates of persons but constitute integrated wholes that exert a formative influence upon those within them. As individuals establish laws, customs, and institutions, they generate a network of relations that acquires its own coherence and, in turn, exercises a top-down effect on individual behaviour.[24]

Importantly, Durkheim developed this idea within his functionalist framework, which understands society in teleological terms. On this account, each social institution—such as the family, the economy, the legal system, and even informal norms exist to fulfil a determinate function. Taken together, these institutions form an integrated social organism that is more than the sum of its parts and that shapes the conduct of individuals within it.[25]

Interpreted through a Smithian lens, Durkheim’s account supports the conclusion that societies are indeed irreducible wholes. Moreover, insofar as their irreducible wholeness is expressed through a grounding-to-emergence relationship between individuals and social structures, societies may be seen as exemplifying principle 1 and principle 2 of Smithian science.

Resultingly, irreducible wholeness offers a legitimate way to conceive of a society and its corresponding nation states. What is needed next is to link that conception back to Church teaching more thoroughly. A monumental task that should only be taken up by someone with far greater knowledge than I!

To New Horizons

With this essay’s completion we close the first part of our investigation which has documented the interrelation between Smith’s Irreducible Wholeness and the established sciences. To this end, I have attempted to show how the various sciences satisfy the two general principles of Smithian science. However, much more work is needed to demonstrate how and whether my conjectures hold in all cases. 

In the next part, we will shift our focus away from Smithian science to an examination of how Smith’s ideas bear upon the central topics of mind and perception. To this end, I will begin by clarifying the nature of corporeal reality and end with an examination of Kurt Goedel’s epochal theorem from Mathematics.

Bibliography:

Abelson, H., Sussman, G. J., & Sussman, J. (1996). Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs (2nd ed.). MIT Press.

Aviezer, N. (2010). Intelligent design versus evolution. Rambam Maimonides Medical Journal, 1(1), e0007. https://doi.org/10.5041/RMMJ.10007

Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”, https://billdembski.com/intelligent-design/specified-complexity-made-simple/ 

Pope, Whitney. “Durkheim as a Functionalist.” The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3, 1975, pp. 361–79. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105747

Smith, Wolfgang (2023), Physics: A Science in Quest of An Ontology (PSQ). Edition 2. Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation.

Smith,  Wolfgang (2021) “Irreducible Wholeness and Dembski’s Theorem”, Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation, 

Smith, Wolfgang (2019) “To be or not to be an Apple”, Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation

Behe, M.J. (2006). Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. Touchstone book (2 ed.). Free Press. p. 39

Sheldrake, Rupert (1981). A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation. J P Tarcher.

Seifert, Vanessa A. (2020). The strong emergence of molecular structure. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-25.

Ellis, G. F. R. (2012). Recognising Top-Down Causation. arXiv:1212.2275 

[1] Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”

[2]  Aviezer, “Intelligent Design versus Evolution”

[3] Smith, “Irreducible Wholeness and Dembski’s Theorem”

[4] Smith, Physics: A Science in Quest of an Ontology, P.25

[5] Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”

[6] Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”

[7] Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”

[8] Smith, “To be or not to be an Apple”

[9] Smith, Irreducible Wholeness and Dembski’s Theorem

[10] Smith, Irreducible Wholeness and Dembski’s Theorem

[11] Dembski, “Specified Complexity Made Simple”

[12] Behe, M.J. (2006). Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. Touchstone book (2 ed.). Free Press. p. 39.

[13] Behe, M.J. (2006). Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. Touchstone book (2 ed.). Free Press. p. 39.

[14] Behe, M.J. (2006). Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution. Touchstone book (2 ed.). Free Press. p. 39.

[15] Sheldrake, A New Science of Life, Chapter 4.

[16] Sheldrake, A New Science of Life, Chapter 2 and 3.

[17] Sheldrake, A New Science of Life, Chapter 4 and 5

[18] Sheldrake, A New Science of Life, Chapter 4.

[19] Sheldrake, A New Science of Life, Chapter 4.

[20] Seifert, The Strong Emergence of Molecular Structure

[21]Ellis, Recognising Top-Down Causation

[22] Ellis, Recognising Top-Down Causation

[23]  Abelson and Sussman, Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs, P.32

[24] Durkheim as a Functionalist: The Sociological Quarterly

[25] Durkheim as a Functionalist: The Sociological Quarterly