Findings of Science: John Taylor

This essay explores Wolfgang Smith’s notion of irreducible wholeness. 

Firstly, by outlining/defining IW and the role that it plays within the three metaphysical domains of Smith’s cosmology: the corporeal, the physical and the transcorporeal. It is stated that IW sits at the centre of the cosmic icon as the “proximate source of all cosmic being”. 

From this, it addresses three questions which I take to be central to furthering Smith’s research program:

1) How can IW stand alone? 

2) If IW is the source of all cosmic being how then can sums of parts have any being? 3) What is the relationship between vertical causation, horizontal causation and irreducible wholeness?

In his final book, Physics: A Science in Quest of an Ontology (PSQ) Wolfgang Smith introduces a concept largely truant from modern ontology called Irreducible Wholeness (IW).

In contrast to what might be called “ordinary wholeness”, Smith defines IW as a kind of wholeness that is greater than a sum of parts. Although, IW is undoubtedly a universal, that is a generalized property, like all universals IW comes equipped with exemplars in the corporeal (perceivable) world. Included among the most compelling of these exemplars are colours and sounds—which owing to their continuous nature and lack of self-contained parts must be IWs.

At first inspection, Smith’s definition of IW appears to fully capture the concept: IW is simply that which is more than a sum of parts. But is this really all there is to IW? Is IW just an abstracted super-wholeness, or is there more to IW than being “more than a sum of parts”? After all, if IW is the proximate source of all cosmic being, as Smith maintains, then it must possess a greater depth than the generic transcendence of summation.

Motivated by these quandaries, in this essay, I will probe more deeply into Smith’s notion of irreducible wholeness. To this end, I will present my thoughts in two parts followed by a conclusion. In part 1, I will summarise the nature of and role that IW plays in Smith’s ontology. Following suit, in part 2, I will address several questions concerning the ontological role and metaphysical depth of irreducible wholeness. Questions which I believe must be answered to begin furthering Smith’s research programme.

To understand the role that IW plays in Smith’s ontology of science you have to firstly understand a few background concepts, which I will now introduce.

The first of these concepts is that, according to Wolfgang Smith, the cosmos we inhabit can be split into two core domains: the corporeal and the physical.

What Smith calls the corporeal domain is basically the world of sensory qualities—similar to what Husserl calls the “phenomenal world”. That is the world of colours, sounds, tastes, textures and smells as we perceive them. Departing from conventional wisdom, Smith holds that sensory qualities carry a genuine mind-independence. Meaning that they are not mental paint being brushed onto a blank canvas of quantity, as Descartes or Locke might assert. But are instead external properties of objects possessing substantial being.

By contrast what Smith calls the “physical domain” is the domain of quantities—particularly those quantities deployed by the physicist in his physical theories. Thus, for any corporeal object X, there is a corresponding subcorporeal object SX: X as conceived by the physicist.

Importantly, the specific theoretical framework which the physicist uses to describe SX is largely a matter of his choice. For instance:

• A Newtonian might conceive our red apple as a Galilean point-mass following f = ma
• A quantum theorist might conceive it as a collection of wave functions

While the physicist’s theory does shape how SX is described this fact does not mean that SX is literally subjective. On the contrary, SX is a quantitative potentiality ordered towards prediction-making (isomorphic to all physical theories). However, what is “subjective” or supplied by the physicist, is the mathematical formalism attached to an SX. As Arthur Eddington once said, “the mathematics is not present until we put it there”. With Wolfgang Smith’s ontology in hand, Eddington’s statement thus becomes more transparent than ever before.

In addition to harbouring the subcorporeal world, the physical domain also encompasses the transcorporeal realm: a domain of quantity not directly tied to an SX. In his final book Smith identifies the physics of the transcorporeal with that of quantum theory. Nevertheless, despite its transcorporeal origins, quantum theory can still be applied to an SX. However, the precise mechanism behind this applicational process is so complex and, in many respects, under-interpreted—that it arguably requires an entire essay of its own to be explained!

At this juncture, one might be forgiven for thinking that the only factor distinguishing the corporeal from the physical is the presence of qualities. However, crucially, this is not exactly the case. In fact, what really allows for the demarcation of the corporeal from the physical is the ontology of St Thomas Aquinas, aptly called Thomism. While a full exposition of Thomistic metaphysics vastly exceeds the scope of this essay, I can and will now explain the basic distinctions of Aquinas’ ontology and how it applies to Prof Smith’s thought.

The first fundamental distinction in Thomistic ontology is that between essence and existence. Put simply:

• Existence refers to that a thing is
• Essence refers to what a thing is

For example, an apple’s essence is its being an apple, while its existence is its being instantiated in reality—present in a way that allows it to be encountered and interacted with.

According to Aquinas:

• In God there is no distinction between essence and existence
• In all beings other than God, essence and existence are totally distinct

Furthermore, self-standing beings that possess this distinction and can also instantiate properties called accidents are what Aquinas calls substances. For example, a dog can exist independently (excluding its participation in God) and can instantiate sets of properties—such as being black or white—without inducing any change to its essence.

The second major distinction in Thomistic ontology is that between potency and act:

• Potency refers to the potential for something to acquire a possible future state
• Act refers to the actualisation of that possibility

For example, an oak tree seed has the potency to grow, and this potency can be actualised, with enough water and sunlight, into a fully-fledged oak.

This distinction is further illuminated by the concepts of matter and substantial form:

• Matter = potentiality awaiting actualisation
• Substantial form = the principle that actualises matter into a specific natural kind

In embracing a branch of Thomism rooted in Neo-Platonism, Wolfgang Smith distinguishes the physical from the corporeal through the presence of substantial form.

Better still, we might say that the subcorporeal is an essential part of the corporeal, participating as “quantitative potency” in the substantial forms of corporeal objects.

Having distinguished the corporeal from the physical, Smith also makes explicit a distinction only implicit in Aquinas: that between Horizontal and Vertical Causation.

• Horizontal Causation: causality acting in time by way of a sequence of events (the causality of physics)
• Vertical Causation (VC): causality operating outside time and space, acting instantaneously, proper to substantial form

This brings us to Irreducible Wholeness, which Smith identifies as the proximate source of all vertical causation—and thus of being.

Smith explicitly states that IW sits at the centre of the “cosmic icon”, as a stand-alone entity, in a plane he calls the Aeviternal realm.

For Aquinas, the aeviternal realm is a modality of duration not strictly temporal. For Smith, it is a plane of genuine unchangeability. It includes:

• Mathematical and geometric forms
• “Celestial corporeality”
• And beneath all these: Irreducible Wholeness

On Smith’s reading, Thomistic substances and all aeviternal modalities emanate, via vertical causation, from IW.

Thus IW functions as the yardstick for what it is to have being in the cosmos.

Having outlined Smith’s notion of IW and its role within his ontology, let us now turn to several important questions:

1. What does Smith mean when he asserts that IW stands alone?
2. If IW is the source of all being, how can sums of parts possess any being?
3. What is the relationship between vertical causation, horizontal causation, and IW?

Wholeness is traditionally a property, not a substance. Properties belong to something more fundamental. We never encounter “being six feet” in isolation.

So how can IW exist independently?

Smith’s answer draws on Catherine Pickstock’s “Esoteric Thomism”: the substance–accident distinction collapses when viewed relative to God.

Thus:

• Substances do not truly “stand alone”
• Everything participates in the divine act
• Therefore, a property (like IW) can be upheld directly by God

Just as God upholds the accidents of bread and wine in the Eucharist without their usual substance, so too God may uphold IW as the first cosmic principle of actualisation.

Smith sometimes implies that only IWs have being. But quantities—sums of parts—clearly exist.

A resolution:

• IW defines proper being
• Sums of parts possess derivative existence

Moreover, mathematical functions (which generate sums) are universals existing in the aeviternal realm—and thus are themselves IWs.

Therefore, even sums of parts derive their existence from IW.

At first glance:

• IW → VC
• HC operates at the physical level

But Smith also says the cosmos is an irreducible whole. Time itself is irreducible in two ways:

• As a cosmic ordering of before/after
• As the phenomenal flow of time

This suggests a deeper interweaving.

The proposal:

• Vertical causation has two modes 
  • A timeless, instantaneous mode (Smith’s original)
  • A temporal but irreducible mode (our own corporeal agency)

When we walk, the causality is not reducible to physics. It is irreducible, temporal, and whole.

Horizontal causation is therefore:

• A shadow cast by vertical causation
• A quantitative fiction tethered to corporeal IW

Thus:

• IW conditions VC
• VC (in both modes) casts HC as its measurable shadow

In this essay, I have sought to address several key questions surrounding Smith's concept of irreducible wholeness. While the responses provided here are brief, I hope they offer valuable insight into these critical issues. However, it is worth noting that there remain many further questions to explore, particularly regarding the relationship between IW and Thomistic ideas like substantial form. I will delve deeper into these questions in the next article.

Smith, Wolfgang (2016), In Quest of Catholicity, Edition 1, Angelico Press
Smith, Wolfgang (2023), Physics: A Science in Quest of An Ontology (PSQ). Edition 2. Philos-Sophia Initiative Foundation.
Smith, Wolfgang (2005). The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key (TQE). Edition 3 Hillsdale, N.Y.: Sophia Perennis.
Smith, Wolfgang (2013), Ancient Wisdom and Modern Misconceptions: A Critique of Contemporary Scientism. Edition 3. Angelico Press.
Eddington, A.S. (1939) The Philosophy of Physical Science. Macmillan, New York.
IEP, Aquinas: Metaphysics: https://iep.utm.edu/thomas-aquinas-metaphysics/
Alex O’Connor Interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqWTlUOhowk
Smith, Cosmic versus Measurable Time, PSIF, 2021
Smith, From Schrodinger’s Cat to Thomistic Ontology, PSIF, 2018
The Works of Plato, 1804, Vol II, Thomas Taylor, London, R. Wilks, Chancery-Lane